Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions
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- Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, 1993.
"Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions,"
- North, Douglass C., 1993.
"Economic Performance through Time,"
Nobel Prize in Economics documents
1993-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Stefan Voigt, 1999. "Implicit Consitutional Change-Changing the Meaning of the Constitution Without Changing the Text of the Document," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 197-224, May.
- Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Hartmut Kliemt, 1993. "On justifying a minimum welfare state," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 159-172, March.
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