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Factores determinantes empíricos de las buenas instituciones: ¿sabemos algo a ciencia cierta?

  • Stéphane Straub

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) Hay un abundante cúmulo de elementos de juicio empíricos que vinculan a las instituciones que funcionan bien y la buena gestión gubernamental con mejores resultados económicos y sociales. Determinar qué combinación de factores produce mejores instituciones es por ende un desafío importante. En este sentido, este trabajo tiene un objetivo doble. En primer lugar, se analizan de un modo crítico los resultados de la obra publicada sobre esta materia y se trata de evaluar su nivel de validez y se analiza una metodología alterna. En segundo lugar, se emplea una base de datos más amplia que incluye todos los aspectos analizados anteriormente de otra manera, para llegar a resultados empíricos sistemáticos. Después de tratar los mecanismos de comprobación tradicionales del grado de validez, por ejemplo, en la obra publicada empírica sobre el crecimiento, que parece ser de una utilidad limitada, se introduce el análisis de factores como un paso preliminar hacia una especificación del modelo y subsiguientemente se realiza un análisis de múltiples regresiones. De los cuatro niveles de explicación que identificamos, es decir, variables de control e históricas, la naturaleza del juego político, el tamaño y la naturaleza de las rentas existentes a ser distribuidas y la naturaleza y calidad de los incentivos burocráticos, este último parece ser el más claramente vinculado con la calidad institucional. No obstante, los resultados no son del todo valederos cuando se tratan problemas de endogeneidad. También se estudian varios tipos de interacciones y efectos no lineales, sin arribarse a nuevas percepciones claras. Se concluye abordando la fragilidad de los datos existentes, en particular con respecto a la estructura de los incentivos, y la necesidad de una mejor comprensión teórica de los mecanismos subyacentes.

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4216.

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Date of creation: Jun 2000
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4216
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