Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality
This paper explores the links between political rules and institutional quality. The paper concentrates on two political measures: the presence of checks and balances in the political system and an index of political particularism that measures the incentives for politicians to build personal support bases. The paper finds a positive correlation between checks and balances and institutional quality. It also finds that intermediate levels of particularism are associated with higher institutional quality. Copyright 2001 Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 13 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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