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The Covid-19 pandemic: collective action and European public policy under stress

Author

Listed:
  • Kovac Mitja
  • Elkanawati Amira
  • Gjikolli Vita

    (University of Ljubljana School of Economics and Business)

  • Vandenberghe Ann-Sophie

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam Erasmus School of Law)

Abstract

The European continent faces an apocalyptic pandemic that poses mortal danger to millions of citizens. This paper seeks to address the role played by European public policy in addressing the Covid-19 pandemic. Currently, each Member State across Europe is applying its own measures to deal with the coronavirus; namely, decentralised decision-making that could trigger political tensions among the states. The paper argues that European public policy must change rapidly and fundamentally if these tensions are to be successfully managed; otherwise, such policy might simply cease to exist. Moreover, the known and notorious problem of collective action, information asymmetries, irrationality, negative externalities and the related free-riding phenomenon persistently are distorting the Member States’ combined efforts, resulting in deficient attempts to contain the spread of Covid-19. The paper also argues that the current unprecedented outbreak of this superspreading virus calls for a bigger EU-wide coordinated response. We argue that the Covid-19 pandemic is a good example of an area in which the central EU level holds a comparative advantage over lower levels of government. In addition, the paper offers several substantive insights into ways to improve the public policy response in the ‘war’ against Covid-19.

Suggested Citation

  • Kovac Mitja & Elkanawati Amira & Gjikolli Vita & Vandenberghe Ann-Sophie, 2020. "The Covid-19 pandemic: collective action and European public policy under stress," Central European Journal of Public Policy, Sciendo, vol. 14(2), pages 47-59, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:vrs:cejopp:v:14:y:2020:i:2:p:47-59:n:2
    DOI: 10.2478/cejpp-2020-0005
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Covid-19 pandemic; negative externality; collective action problem; coordination; economics of federalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • C26 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation
    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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