IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/idb/brikps/1129.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Making of Policy: Institutionalized or Not?

Author

Listed:
  • Carlos Scartascini
  • Mariano Tommasi

Abstract

This paper develops a framework for analyzing different policymaking styles, their causes and their consequences in Latin America, finding that lower institutionalization and greater use of alternative political technologies (APTs) are more likely the lower the cost of using these technologies, the higher the potential damage they can cause, the lower the wealth of the economy, and the more asymmetric the distribution of de jure political power. Moreover, strategic complementarity exists in the use of alternative political technologies; for instance "bribes by the rich" and "protests by the poor" are likely to be countervailing forces, and will both occur in polities with weaker political institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi, 2009. "The Making of Policy: Institutionalized or Not?," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1129, Inter-American Development Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:1129
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/1129/The%20Making%20of%20Policy%3a%20Institutionalized%20or%20Not%3f.pdf?sequence=1
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:91:y:1997:i:02:p:245-263_20 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    3. Matthew Ellman & Leonard Wantchekon, 2000. "Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 499-531.
    4. repec:idb:idbbks:329 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Pablo T. Spiller & Ernesto H. Stein & Mariano Tommasi & Carlos Scartascini & Lee J. Alston & Marcus André Melo & Bernardo Mueller & Carlos Pereira & Cristóbal Aninat & John Londregan & Patricio Navia , 2008. "Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 40178 edited by Ernesto H. Stein & Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller & Carlos Scartascini, February.
    6. Alberto Alesina & Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2006. "Reply to Blankart and Koester's Political Economics versus Public Choice Two Views of Political Economy in Competition," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 201-208, May.
    7. Jaime SAAVEDRA & Mariano TOMMASI, 2007. "Informality, the State and the social contract in Latin America: A preliminary exploration," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, pages 279-309.
    8. Daniel Diermeier & Keith Krehbiel, 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 15(2), pages 123-144, April.
    9. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 912-921.
    10. Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2005. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 347-373, March.
    11. Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers, 2010. "Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 1859-1887.
    12. Jose-Luis Evia & Roberto Laserna & Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "Socio-Political Conflict and Economic Performance in Bolivia," CESifo Working Paper Series 2249, CESifo Group Munich.
    13. repec:cup:apsrev:v:98:y:2004:i:04:p:633-652_04 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:cup:apsrev:v:101:y:2007:i:03:p:373-391_07 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Fabiana Machado & Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi, 2011. "Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 55(3), pages 340-365, June.
    16. Michelle Alexopoulos, 2011. "Read All about It!! What Happens Following a Technology Shock?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1144-1179, June.
    17. repec:cup:apsrev:v:93:y:1999:i:03:p:609-624_21 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "Repression or Civil War?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 292-297.
    19. repec:cup:apsrev:v:100:y:2006:i:01:p:41-53_06 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Roger Lagunoff, 2001. "A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 109-132.
    21. Cusack, Thomas R. & Iversen, Torben & Soskice, David, 2007. "Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Institutions, States, Markets SP II 2007-07, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    22. Fabiana Machado & Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi, 2011. "Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 55(3), pages 340-365, June.
    23. Matthew Ellman & Leonard Wantchekon, 1999. "Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest," Economics Working Papers 457, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    24. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    25. Ernesto Dal Bo & Rafael Di Tella, 2003. "Capture by Threat," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1123-1152, October.
    26. Garoupa, Nuno, 2007. "Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 461-474, July.
    27. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1218-1244.
    28. Jess Benhabib & Adam Przeworski, 2006. "The political economy of redistribution under democracy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(2), pages 271-290, October.
    29. Krueger, Alan B. & Schkade, David A., 2008. "The reliability of subjective well-being measures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(8-9), pages 1833-1845, August.
    30. repec:idb:brikps:40178 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Becerra, O. & Cavallo, E. & Scartascini, C., 2012. "The politics of financial development: The role of interest groups and government capabilities," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 626-643.
    2. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Martín Ardanaz, 2010. "Political Institutions, Policymaking, and Economic Policy in Latin America," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1708, Inter-American Development Bank.
    3. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Martín Ardanaz, 2010. "Political Institutions, Policymaking, and Economic Policy in Latin America," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1708, Inter-American Development Bank.
    4. Eduardo Lora & Johanna Fajardo, 2013. "Latin American Middle Classes: The Distance Between Perception and Reality," ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, vol. 0(Fall 2013), pages 33-60, August.
    5. Eduardo Lora & Gustavo Márquez, 1998. "The Employment Problem in Latin America: Perceptions and Stylized Facts," Research Department Publications 4114, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    6. Fabiana Machado & Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi, 2011. "Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 55(3), pages 340-365, June.
    7. Martín Ardanaz & Carlos Scartascini, 2011. "Why Don't We Tax the Rich? Inequality, Legislative Malapportionment, and Personal Income Taxation around the World," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3821, Inter-American Development Bank.
    8. Martin Ardanaz & Marcelo Leiras & Mariano Tommasi, 2012. "The Politics of Federalism in Argentina: Implications for Governance and Accountability," Research Department Publications 4781, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governance; Public Administration & Policy Making; IDB-WP-108;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:1129. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Felipe Herrera Library). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/iadbbus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.