A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty
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- Roger Lagunoff, 2001. "A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 109-132.
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- Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi, 2009. "The Making of Policy: Institutionalized or Not?," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1129, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Lagunoff, Roger, 2009.
"Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 569-583, November.
- Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0505006, EconWPA.
- Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000051, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2016. "Resilient Leaders and Institutional Reform: Theory and Evidence," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 584-623, October.
- Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2005.
"Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions,"
gueconwpa~05-05-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000876, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0501003, EconWPA.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009.
"The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1218-1244, September.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Persson, Torsten, 2007. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 6370, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Besley, Timothy & Persson, Torsten, 2009. "The origins of state capacity: property rights, taxation and politics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 33768, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2007. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," NBER Working Papers 13028, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 47, Econometric Society.
- Kim, Sang-Hyun, 2016. "On the optimal social contract: Agency costs of self-government," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 982-1001.
- Sang-Hyun Kim, 2014. "On the Optimal Social Contract: Agency Costs of Self-Government," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 059, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter, 2016. "Statehood, democracy and preindustrial development," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 58-72.
- repec:eee:pubeco:v:152:y:2017:i:c:p:93-101 is not listed on IDEAS
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- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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