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Making mobilization work: The choice of electoral systems

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  • Ignacio Lago

Abstract

This paper examines the adoption of electoral systems in the last two centuries. I argue that proportional representation (PR) was adopted to make party mobilization more effective when majoritarian electoral systems with many and geographically small districts were no longer an efficient response to the problem of collective action in mass elections. With the expansion of suffrage and the parallel process of national integration, mass parties became technologically feasible and took care of bringing voters to the ballot box. As primary and secondary mobilization are more effective in electoral systems with few and geographically large districts, majoritarian rules were progressively replaced with proportional rules. PR was endorsed by those parties that found it easier to attract voters using a single mobilization strategy with strong economics of scale, and resisted by locally focused parties. This argument is tested using longitudinal and cross section data at both the country and party levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Ignacio Lago, 2021. "Making mobilization work: The choice of electoral systems," Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization 2102, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
    • Handle: RePEc:gov:wpaper:2102
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    File URL: http://infogen.webs.uvigo.es/WP/WP2102.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collective Action; Electoral System; Nationalization; Mobilization; Political Parties; Proportional Representation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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