Voluntary Contributions to Property Rights
This paper reports the results of an experimental test of the Nash equilibrium prediction of voluntary provision of property rights in a contest under anarchy. Speci cally, the experiment investigates whether pre-commitment induces positive provision of property rights. As pre- dicted, zero contributions to property rights are observed without pre- commitment. Positive voluntary contributions are observed with pre- commitment, but are less than predicted. Nonetheless, as predicted, stronger property rights with pre-commitment results in less con ict and more production. The experiment also tests predictions for group- size e ects. While average contributions to property rights are un- a ected by group-size, mean con ict increases and mean production decreases with larger groups. Key Words: Property Rights; Con ict; Public Goods; Experiments
|Date of creation:||2013|
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