Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/00028280260344669
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- Alesina, Alberto & Weder, Beatrice, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," Scholarly Articles 4553011, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 1999. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," NBER Working Papers 7108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
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