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Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilization?

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Listed:
  • Alessandra Casella
  • Barry Eichengreen

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of foreign aid on economic stabilization. Following Alesina and Drazen (1991), we model the delay in stabilizing as the result of a distributional struggle: reforms are postponed because they are costly and each distributional faction hopes to reduce its share of the cost by outlasting its opponents in obstructing the required policies. Since the delay is used to signal each faction's strength, the effect of the transfer depends on the role it plays in the release of information. We show that this role depends on the timing of the transfer: foreign aid decided and transferred sufficiently early into the game leads to earlier stabilization; but aid decided or transferred too late is destabilizing and encourages further postponement of reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandra Casella & Barry Eichengreen, 1994. "Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilization?," NBER Working Papers 4694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4694
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eichengreen, Barry & Uzan, Marc, 1992. "The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and Implications for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6kr8157r, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    2. Eichengreen, Barry & Uzan, Marc, 1992. "The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and Implications for Eastern Europe and the Former USSR," CEPR Discussion Papers 638, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    4. Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(3), pages 345-364.
    5. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-252, March.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid

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