Handicaps on Timing to Improve Reputation
An agent may be able to address a task at different times, with the state of nature more favorable to the task in some periods over others. Success on a task will therefore more greatly improve the agent's reputation following success on a task if he is constrained in choosing when to address the task than if he enjoys flexibility in timing. These considerations may explain why presidents emphasize achievements in their first hundred days in office, and why performance of the economy in only some quarters of a president's term affect elections.
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- van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1992.
"Intertemporal Speculation, Shortages and the Political Economy of Price Reform,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(415), pages 1395-1406, November.
- Van Wijnbergen, S., 1991. "Intertemporal Speculation , Shortages annd the Political Economy of Price Reform," Papers 9149, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- van Wijnbergen, S., 1991. "Intertemporal Speculation, Shortages and the Political Economy of Price Reform," Discussion Paper 1991-49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Klaas J. Beniers & Robert Dur, 2004. "Politiciansâ€™ Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 1228, CESifo Group Munich.
- Sumon Majumdar & Sharun W. Mukand, 2004. "Policy Gambles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1207-1222, September.
- Sumon Majumdar & Sharun W. Mukand, 2004. "Policy Gambles," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0407, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 345-364. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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