Handicaps on Timing to Improve Reputation
An agent may be able to address a task at different times, with the state of nature more favorable to the task in some periods over others. Success on a task will therefore more greatly improve the agent's reputation following success on a task if he is constrained in choosing when to address the task than if he enjoys flexibility in timing. These considerations may explain why presidents emphasize achievements in their first hundred days in office, and why performance of the economy in only some quarters of a president's term affect elections.
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- Sumon Majumdar & Sharun W. Mukand, 2004.
Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University
0407, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Klaas J. Beniers & Robert Dur, 2004. "Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-065/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 Aug 2005.
- Robert A.J. Dur, 1999. "Why do Policy Makers stick to Inefficient Decisions?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-050/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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