Initial offers and outcomes in wage bargaining: who wins?
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- Jaume Garcia, & Sergi Jiménez-Martín, 2007. "Initial Offers and Outcomes in Wage Barganing: Who Wins?," Working Papers 2007-22, FEDEA.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Elisabetta Lodigiani & Sara Salomone, 2012.
"Migration-induced Transfers of Norms. The Case of Female Political Empowerment,"
DEGIT Conference Papers
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- Elisabetta Lodigiani & Sara Salomone, 2012. "Migration-Induced Transfers of Norms. The Case of Femal Political Empowerment," Development Working Papers 343, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano, revised 13 Nov 2012.
- Jung, Sven, 2013. "Employment Adjustment in German Firms," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79696, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Jung, Sven, 2012. "Employment adjustment in German firms," Discussion Papers 80, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsClaim; Offer; Wage settlement; Bargaining power; Collective bargaining; Wages; Panel data; Sample selection; J50; D82; C33;
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
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