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Learning in Sequential Wage Negotiations: Theory and Evidence

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  • Kuhn, Peter
  • Gu, Wulong

Abstract

When union-firm pairs bargain sequentially, and when unobserved components of firms' abilities to pay are subject to correlated shocks, unions that bargain later in a sequence can acquire valuable information by observing previous bargaining outcomes in their industry. The authors derive the implications of this kind of learning in an asymmetric information model of wage negotiations and argue that the most robust implication is a lower incidence of strikes among 'followers' than 'leaders' in wage negotiations. Considerable empirical support for this implication is found in a long panel of Canadian contract negotiations. Copyright 1999 by University of Chicago Press.

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  • Kuhn, Peter & Gu, Wulong, 1999. "Learning in Sequential Wage Negotiations: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 109-140, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:17:y:1999:i:1:p:109-40
    DOI: 10.1086/209915
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    Cited by:

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    2. Tournadre, Fabienne & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2004. "Learning from strikes," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 243-264, April.
    3. Alex Lehr & Jana Vyrastekova & Agnes Akkerman & René Torenvlied, 2018. "Horizontal and vertical spillovers in wage bargaining: A theoretical framework and experimental evidence," Rationality and Society, , vol. 30(1), pages 3-53, February.
    4. Zoë B. Cullen & Bobak Pakzad‐Hurson, 2023. "Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(3), pages 765-802, May.
    5. Lehr, Alex & Vyrastekova, Jana & Akkerman, Agnes & Torenvlied, René, 2016. "Spillovers and conflict in wage bargaining: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 59-68.
    6. Clark, Andrew E. & Loheac, Youenn, 2007. ""It wasn't me, it was them!" Social influence in risky behavior by adolescents," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 763-784, July.
    7. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    8. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2009. "The Case for Virtual Strike.An Appraisal of the Italian Proposal," Econometica Working Papers wp08, Econometica.
    9. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2010. "The case for the virtual strike," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 9(1), pages 75-75, April.
    10. Calabuig, Vicente & Olcina, Gonzalo, 2000. "Commitment and strikes in wage bargaining," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 349-372, May.
    11. Mikhail Drugov, 2021. "Bargaining with informational and payoff externalities," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 398-419, May.
    12. Cullen, Zoë & Perez-Truglia, Ricardo, 2023. "The salary taboo privacy norms and the diffusion of information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    13. Stéphane Mahuteau, 2006. "Labor Economics ‐ by P. Cahuc and A. Zylberberg," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 82(258), pages 371-372, September.
    14. Javier Pérez & A. Sánchez, 2011. "Is there a signalling role for public wages? Evidence for the euro area based on macro data," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 421-445, October.
    15. Drugov, Mikhail, 2014. "Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 10021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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