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Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations

  • Lemke, Robert J.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.

Volume (Year): 28 (2004)
Issue (Month): 9 (July)
Pages: 1847-1875

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Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:28:y:2004:i:9:p:1847-1875
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc

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  1. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
  2. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1846, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  3. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 120-154, June.
  4. Aldo Rustichini & Anne P. Villamil, 1996. "Intertemporal pricing in markets with differential information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 211-227.
  5. Tracy, Joseph S, 1987. "An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(2), pages 149-73, April.
  6. Card, David, 1988. "Longitudinal Analysis of Strike Activity," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(2), pages 147-76, April.
  7. Joel Sobel & Takahashi, 1983. "A Multi-stage Model of Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 255, David K. Levine.
  8. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
  9. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 23-50, February.
  10. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
  11. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 221-247.
  12. Vincent, Daniel R, 1998. "Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 275-93, May.
  13. Vroman, Wayne, 1984. "Wage Contract Settlements in U.S. Manufacturing," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 66(4), pages 661-65, November.
  14. Cho, In-Koo, 1987. "A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1367-89, November.
  15. Hayes, Beth, 1984. "Unions and Strikes with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 57-83, January.
  16. Kennan, John, 1995. "Repeated contract negotiations with private information," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 447-472, November.
  17. Kennan, J. & Wilson, R., 1991. "Bargaining with Private Information," Working Papers 90-01rev, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  18. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages S87-130, Supplemen.
  19. McConnell, Sheena, 1989. "Strikes, Wages, and Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 801-15, September.
  20. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114.
  21. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
  22. Oliver Hart, 1989. "Bargaining and Strikes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(1), pages 25-43.
  23. Kennan, J., 1997. "Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information," Working papers 9708, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  24. Peter C. Cramton, 1984. "Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 579-593.
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