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Striking Features of the Labor Market: Empirical Evidence

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  • William H. Greene
  • Ana P. Martins

Abstract

The present paper aims at explaining strike incidence, measured by the proportion of strikers observed in each sector, and strike severeness, proxied by a measure of mean strike hours lost per worker in each industry. We find that Industry concentration dissuades striking – more concentrated sectors provide higher wage growth, hence, strike disputes are rarer and terminate more quickly. A positive firm size effect was encountered more often than the industry concentration one, suggesting a link to monitoring problems. Tenure length seems to affect strike activity positively. Unionization has a positive effect on strike occurrence, as expected, but not always significant.

Suggested Citation

  • William H. Greene & Ana P. Martins, 2013. "Striking Features of the Labor Market: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 56(2), pages 25-53.
  • Handle: RePEc:eei:journl:v:56:y:2013:i:2:p:25-53
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    Cited by:

    1. Bruna BRUNO & Damiano FIORILLO, 2016. "Voluntary Work And Wages," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 87(2), pages 175-202, December.
    2. M. Rosaria Alfano & A. Laura Baraldi, 2014. "Electoral Systems and Economic Growth: What is the Importance of the Proportionality Degree?," EERI Research Paper Series EERI RP 2014/06, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
    3. William H. Greene & Ana P. Martins, 2002. "Striking Features of the Labor Market," EERI Research Paper Series EERI RP 2002/08, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
    4. William H. Greene & Ana P. Martins, 2013. "Striking Features of the Labor Market: Theory," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 56(2), pages 1-24.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strikes; asymmetric information; signaling; labor contracts; part-time work; mean or grouped data and limited dependent variables; binary choice models with mean or grouped data; sample selection with mean data.;

    JEL classification:

    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C24 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models; Threshold Regression Models
    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities

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