Bargaining Structure and Strike Activity
In this paper, the authors examine the nature of the relationship between bargaining structure and strike activity. In particular, they focus on the implications of the fact that the amount of information revealed by a union's actions depends on the bargaining environment in which it operates. The authors demonstrate that a union representing workers of more than one firm will face a greater incentive to reject offers than an independent union. This implies that a merger of two unions or the formation of bargaining coalitions will lead to a greater level of strike activity.
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Volume (Year): 24 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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