The Case for the Virtual Strike. An Appraisal of the Italian Proposal
In this paper we outline the economic rationale behind the virtual strike, and workers’ incentives to use this bargaining solution rather than resorting to standard strike action. We show that, from a welfare perspective, a virtual strike always dominates a standard strike and it would be most needed precisely when workers have weaker incentives to adopt it. We then discuss the pros and cons of legally regulating the virtual strike rather than leaving it to self-regulation. Finally, we apply our findings to the analysis of Italy’s draft legislation on virtual strikes
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