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The Case for the Virtual Strike. An Appraisal of the Italian Proposal

  • Antonio Nicita

    ()

  • Matteo Rizzolli

    ()

In this paper we outline the economic rationale behind the virtual strike, and workers’ incentives to use this bargaining solution rather than resorting to standard strike action. We show that, from a welfare perspective, a virtual strike always dominates a standard strike and it would be most needed precisely when workers have weaker incentives to adopt it. We then discuss the pros and cons of legally regulating the virtual strike rather than leaving it to self-regulation. Finally, we apply our findings to the analysis of Italy’s draft legislation on virtual strikes

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 557.

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Date of creation: Feb 2009
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Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:557
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  1. Robert P. Hebdon & Robert N. Stern, 1998. "Tradeoffs among expressions of industrial conflict: Public sector strike bans and grievance arbitrations," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 51(2), pages 204-221, January.
  2. Putterman, Louis & Skillman, Gilbert L., 1992. "The role of exit costs in the theory of cooperative teams," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 596-618, December.
  3. Alessandro Innocenti & Antonio Nicita, 2009. "Virtual vs. Standard Strike: An Experiment," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 026, University of Siena.
  4. Kennan, John, 1987. "The economics of strikes," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 1091-1137 Elsevier.
  5. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages S87-130, Supplemen.
  6. Reder, Melvin W & Neumann, George R, 1980. "Conflict and Contract: The Case of Strikes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(5), pages 867-86, October.
  7. Francis K. Cheung & Carl Davidson, 1991. "Bargaining Structure and Strike Activity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 345-71, May.
  8. Kuhn, Peter & Gu, Wulong, 1999. "Learning in Sequential Wage Negotiations: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 109-40, January.
  9. Clark, Simon, 1996. "Strike Behaviour When Market Share Matters," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(4), pages 618-39, October.
  10. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March.
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