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Market integration and strike activity

Listed author(s):
  • Mauleon, Ana
  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent

We consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized, imperfectly competitive, industries. We investigate the effects of opening up markets to trade as well as of further market integration on the negotiated wage and the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. From an initial situation of two-way intra-industry trade, an increase in product market integration decreases the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. However, opening up markets to trade has an ambiguous effect on both the wage outcome and the maximum real delay time.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 81 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 154-161

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Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:81:y:2010:i:1:p:154-161
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552

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  1. Joel Watson, 1998. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(3), pages 573-594.
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  3. Dowrick, Steve, 1989. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(398), pages 1123-1142, December.
  4. Peter Cramton & Joseph Tracy, 2003. "Unions, Bargaining and Strikes," Papers of Peter Cramton 02ubs, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 05 Sep 2002.
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  8. MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., "undated". "Strategic union delegaion and inventives for merger," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1829, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Raymond J. Deneckere, 2002. "Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Papers of Peter Cramton 02barg, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 12 Mar 2001.
  10. John M. Abowd & Joseph S. Tracy, 1988. "Market Structure, Strike Activity, and Union Wage Settlements," NBER Working Papers 2595, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Kennan, John, 1987. "The economics of strikes," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 1091-1137 Elsevier.
  12. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages 87-130, Supplemen.
  13. MAULEON , Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., "undated". "Market competition and strike activity," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1658, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Tracy, Joseph S, 1986. "An Investigation into the Determinants of U.S. Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 423-436, June.
  15. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2005. "Strategic union delegation and strike activity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 149-173, February.
  16. Munch, Jakob Roland & Skaksen, Jan Rose, 2002. " Product Market Integration and Wages in Unionized Countries," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(2), pages 289-299, June.
  17. Kennan, J. & Wilson, R., 1991. "Bargaining with Private Information," Working Papers 90-01rev, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  18. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn.
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  20. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  21. Huizinga, H.P., 1993. "International market integration and union wage bargaining," Other publications TiSEM 567712dd-8f03-40d8-8428-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  22. Peter C. Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 205-225.
  23. Jan Rose SØRENSEN, 1993. "Integration of Product Markets when Labour Markets are Unionized," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1993044, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  24. Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy, 1994. "The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes," Papers of Peter Cramton 94jole, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
  25. Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2002. "Union Delegation and Incentives for Merger," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2002010, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  26. Hongbin Cai, 2003. "Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 583-606, October.
  27. Davidson, Carl, 1988. "Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(3), pages 397-422, July.
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