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Market integration and strike activity

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  • Mauleon, Ana
  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent

Abstract

We consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized, imperfectly competitive, industries. We investigate the effects of opening up markets to trade as well as of further market integration on the negotiated wage and the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. From an initial situation of two-way intra-industry trade, an increase in product market integration decreases the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. However, opening up markets to trade has an ambiguous effect on both the wage outcome and the maximum real delay time.

Suggested Citation

  • Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2010. "Market integration and strike activity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 154-161, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:81:y:2010:i:1:p:154-161
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    Cited by:

    1. A. Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch & Cecilia Vergari, 2014. "Unions' Relative Concerns And Strikes In Wage Bargaining," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, pages 374-383.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Intra-industry trade Economic integration Product market;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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