Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information
We consider Rubinstein’s two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns about the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent with stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party’s relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
252, David K. Levine.
- Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy, 1994.
"The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
94jole, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- CAULIER, Jean-François & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2013. "Allocation rules for coalitional network games," CORE Discussion Papers 2013032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B., 1994. "Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 154-168, September.
- Andrew E. Clark and Andrew J. Oswald, .
"Satisfaction and Comparison Income,"
Economics Discussion Papers
419, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Hongbin Cai, 2003. "Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 583-606, October.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, .
"A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation,"
IEW - Working Papers
004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Munich Reprints in Economics 20650, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
- Ed Hopkins, 2008.
"Inequality, Happiness and Relative Concerns: What Actually is their Relationship?,"
122247000000001896, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ed Hopkins, 2008. "Inequality, happiness and relative concerns: What actually is their relationship?," Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 351-372, December.
- Ed Hopkins, 2008. "Inequality, Happiness and Relative Concerns: What Actually is their Relationship?," ESE Discussion Papers 180, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Hopkins, Ed, 2008. "Inequality, Happiness and Relative Concerns: What Actually is their Relationship?," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-01, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, .
"Strategic union delegation and strike activity,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1766, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2002. "Strategic Union Delegation and Strike Activity," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2002011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Duranton, Gilles & Martin, Philippe & Mayer, Thierry & Mayneris, Florian, 2010. "The Economics of Clusters: Lessons from the French Experience," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199592203.
- Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2011. "Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 507-516.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521715348 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521887427 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
- Watson, Joel, 1998. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 573-94, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:4:y:2013:i:3:p:329-338:d:26739. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (XML Conversion Team)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.