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Allocation rules for coalitional network games

Author

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  • CAULIER, Jean-François

    () (CES, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, F-75647 Paris, France)

  • MAULEON, Ana

    () (CEREC, Saint-Louis University, Brussels, Belgium; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium)

  • VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent

    () (CEREC, Saint-Louis University, Brussels, Belgium; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium)

Abstract

Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players organized into a network and a coalition structure. We adopt a flexible approach assuming that players organize themselves the best way possible by forming the efficient coalitional network structure. We propose two allocation rules that distribute the value of the efficient coalitional network structure: the atom-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule and the player-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule.

Suggested Citation

  • CAULIER, Jean-François & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2013. "Allocation rules for coalitional network games," CORE Discussion Papers 2013032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2013032
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fleurbaey,Marc & Maniquet,François, 2011. "A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521715348, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Förster, Manuel & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2016. "Trust and manipulation in social networks," Network Science, Cambridge University Press, pages 216-243.
    2. Kirchsteiger, Georg & Mantovani, Marco & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2016. "Limited farsightedness in network formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 97-120.
    3. DUJARDIN, Claire & lorant, VINCENT & THOMAS, Isabelle, 2013. "Self-assessed health of elderly people in Brussels: does the built environment matter?," CORE Discussion Papers 2013048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2013. "Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 1-10, June.
    5. PAPAVASILIOU, Anthony & HE, Yi & SVOBODA, Alva, 2013. "Self-commitment of combined cycle units under electricity price uncertainty," CORE Discussion Papers 2013051, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Chevalier, Philippe & Lamas, Alejandro & Lu, Liang & Mlinar, Tanja, 2015. "Revenue management for operations with urgent orders," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, pages 476-487.
    7. AVELLA, Pasquale & BOCCIA, Maurizio & WOLSEY, Laurence, 2013. "Single item reformulations for a vendor managed inventory routing problem: computational experience with benchmark instances," CORE Discussion Papers 2013045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    networks; coalition structures; allocation rules;

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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