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Flexible network rules for identified externalities

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  • Noemí Navarro

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UR - Université de Rennes)

Abstract

I propose three modifications of Jackson's flexible network axiom (Jackson, 2005) when the structure of externalities across components have been identified. The first one takes into account the information about the externalities across components. The second one allows for coalitional deviations once the network has been formed. Finally, the third one tries to find a compromise with component efficiency (Myerson, 1977a).
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Suggested Citation

  • Noemí Navarro, 2010. "Flexible network rules for identified externalities," Post-Print hal-05113094, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05113094
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Allocation rules for network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April.
    2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
    3. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 225-229, August.
    4. Noemí Navarro, 2007. "Fair allocation in networks with externalities," Post-Print hal-05113093, HAL.
    5. Navarro, Noemi, 2007. "Fair allocation in networks with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 354-364, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carayol, Nicolas & Delille, Rémy & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2015. "Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 50-53.
    2. Caulier, Jean-François & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2015. "Allocation rules for coalitional network games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 80-88.
    3. Hideto Koizumi, 2023. "The enemy of my enemy is my friend: new conditions for network games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(2), pages 223-233, October.
    4. Noemí Navarro, 2013. "Expected fair allocation in farsighted network formation," Post-Print hal-05113101, HAL.
    5. Nils Roehl, 2013. "Two-Stage Allocation Rules," Working Papers Dissertations 01, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    6. Noemí Navarro, 2014. "Expected fair allocation in farsighted network formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 287-308, August.
    7. Nils Roehl, 2013. "Two-Stage Allocation Rules," Working Papers CIE 73, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.

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