Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
A new axiomatic characterization of the two-step Shapley value (Kamijo, 2009) is presented based on a solidarity principle of the members of any union: when the game changes due to the addition or deletion of players outside the union, all members of the union will share the same gains/losses.
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Game Theory and Information
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