Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
We replace the axiom of fairness used in the characterization of the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) by fairness for neighbors in order to characterize the component-wise egalitarian solution. When a link is broken, fairness states the two players incident to the link should be affected similarly while fairness for neighbors states that a player incident to the link and any of his other neighbors should be affected similarly. Fairness for neighbors is also used to characterize the component-wise egalitarian surplus solution and a two-step egalitarian solution. These results highlight that egalitarian and marginalistic allocation rules can be obtained by applying the same equal gain/loss property to different types of players.
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