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An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games

Author

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  • van den Brink, René
  • Khmelnitskaya, Anna
  • van der Laan, Gerard

Abstract

We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called fair distribution of the surplus.

Suggested Citation

  • van den Brink, René & Khmelnitskaya, Anna & van der Laan, Gerard, 2012. "An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 786-789.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:786-789
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.026
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marco Slikker, 2005. "A characterization of the position value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(4), pages 505-514, November.
    2. Herings, P. Jean Jacques & van der Laan, Gerard & Talman, Dolf, 2008. "The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 77-92, January.
    3. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "Fairness and fairness for neighbors: The difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 263-267.
    4. Borm, P.E.M. & Owen, G. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "On the position value for communication situations," Other publications TiSEM 5a8473e4-1df7-42df-ad53-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:02:n:s0219198909002261 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Frank Huettner, 2015. "Efficient extensions of the Myerson value," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 819-827, December.
    2. Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Frank Huettner, 2015. "Efficient extensions of communication values," Working Papers hal-01376907, HAL.
    3. repec:spr:annopr:v:264:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-017-2661-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Shan, Erfang & Zhang, Guang & Dong, Yanxia, 2016. "Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 22-28.
    5. repec:eee:ecolet:v:165:y:2018:i:c:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Béal, Sylvain & Casajus, André & Huettner, Frank, 2016. "On the existence of efficient and fair extensions of communication values for connected graphs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 103-106.
    7. repec:spr:annopr:v:243:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-015-1808-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. René Brink & Anna Khmelnitskaya & Gerard Laan, 2016. "An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 243(1), pages 179-198, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; TU game; Communication graph; Myerson value;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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