An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games
We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called fair distribution of the surplus.
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- Yoshio Kamijo, 2009. "A Two-Step Shapley Value For Cooperative Games With Coalition Structures," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(02), pages 207-214.
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