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Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication

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Listed author(s):
  • Napel, Stefan
  • Nohn, Andreas
  • Alonso-Meijide, José Maria

Abstract

Indices that evaluate the distribution of power in simple games are commonly required to be monotonic in voting weights when the game represents a voting body such as a shareholder meeting, parliament, etc. The standard notions of local or global monotonicity are bound to be violated, however, if cooperation is restricted to coalitions that are connected by a communication graph. This paper proposes new monotonicity concepts for power in games with communication structure and investigates the monotonicity properties of the Myerson value, the restricted Banzhaf value, the position value, and the average tree solution.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489612000571
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 64 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 247-257

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:64:y:2012:i:3:p:247-257
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.05.008
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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