The Harsanyi paradox and the 'right to talk' in bargaining among coalitions
We introduce a non-cooperative model of bargaining when players are divided into coalitions. The model is a modification of the mechanism in Vidal-Puga (Economic Theory, 2005) so that all the players have the same chances to make proposals. This means that players maintain their own 'right to talk' when joining a coalition. We apply this model to an intriguing example presented by Krasa, Tamimi and Yannelis (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003) and show that the Harsanyi paradox (forming a coalition may be disadvantageous) disappears.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983.
"Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games,"
567, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Krasa, Stefan & Temimi, Akram & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2003. "Coalition structure values in differential information economies: is unity a strength?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 51-62, February.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
252, David K. Levine.
- Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "A bargaining approach to the Owen value and the Nash solution with coalition structure," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 679-701, 04.
- Amer, Rafael & Carreras, Francese & Gimenez, Jose Miguel, 2002. "The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: an axiomatic characterization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 45-54, January.
- Guillaume HAERINGER, 1999.
"A New Weight Scheme for the Shapley Value,"
Working Papers of BETA
9910, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Yoshio Kamijo, 2009. "A Two-Step Shapley Value For Cooperative Games With Coalition Structures," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(02), pages 207-214.
- Levy, Anat & Mclean, Richard P., 1989. "Weighted coalition structure values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 234-249, September.
- Kamijo, Yoshio, 2008. "Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 336-349, November.
- Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2008.
"The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure,"
8904, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2010. "The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(2), pages 795-806, December.
- Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
- Calvo, Emilio & Javier Lasaga, J. & Winter, Eyal, 1996. "The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 171-182, June.
- Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996.
"Bargaining and Value,"
Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-80, March.
- Chae, Suchan & Moulin, Herve, 2004.
"Bargaining among Groups: An Axiomatic Viewpoint,"
2004-01, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Roberto Serrano, 2004.
"Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003,"
2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2008.
"Balanced per capita contributions and levels structure of cooperation,"
8208, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- María Gómez-Rúa & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2011. "Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 167-176, July.
- Calvo, Emilio & Gutiérrez, Esther, 2010.
"Solidarity in games with a coalition structure,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 196-203, November.
- Winter, Eyal, 1992.
"The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 132-144, January.
- Eyal Winter, 1989. "The Consistency and Potential for Values of Games with Coalition Structure," Discussion Paper Serie A 242, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Vidal-Puga, Juan & Bergantinos, Gustavo, 2003. "An implementation of the Owen value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 412-427, August.
- Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001.
"Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
- David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Chae, Suchan & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "A group bargaining solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 37-53, July.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Albizuri, M. Josune & Zarzuelo, Jose M., 2004. "On coalitional semivalues," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 221-243, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0501005. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.