A new weight scheme for the Shapley value
It is well known since Owen (Management Science, 1968) that the weights in the weighted Shapley value cannot be interpreted as a measure of power (i.e. of the ability to bargain) of the players. This paper proposes a new weight scheme for the Shapley value. Weights in this framework have to be interpreted as a measure of bargaining power. Two different axiomatic characterization of this new value are proposed: one including the weights in the axioms and one without.
|Date of creation:||15 Jul 1998|
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|Note:||Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript - A4; pages: 11 . 11 pages, postscript, prepared from dvips|
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- Nowak, A.S. & Radzik, T., 1995. "On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 389-405.
- Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "On Weighted Shapley Values," Discussion Papers 602, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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