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A New Weight Scheme for the Shapley Value

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  • Guillaume HAERINGER

Abstract

It is well known since Owen (Manag. Sci. 1968) that the weights in the weighted Shapley value cannot be interpreted as a measure of power (i.e. of the ability to bargain) of the players. This paper proposes a new weight scheme for the Shapley value. Weights in this framework have to be interpreted as a measure of bargaining power. Two different axiomatic characterizations of this new value are proposed: one including the weights in the axioms and one without.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume HAERINGER, 1999. "A New Weight Scheme for the Shapley Value," Working Papers of BETA 9910, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:9910
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    File URL: http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/1999/9910.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nowak, A.S. & Radzik, T., 1995. "On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 389-405.
    2. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "On Weighted Shapley Values," Discussion Papers 602, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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    Cited by:

    1. Conrado M. Manuel & Daniel Martín, 2020. "A Monotonic Weighted Shapley Value," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 627-654, August.
    2. Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(2), pages 283-313, October.
    3. Ghintran, Amandine, 2013. "Weighted position values," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 157-163.
    4. Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2010. "The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(2), pages 795-806, December.
    5. Niharika Kakoty & Surajit Borkotokey & Rajnish Kumar & Abhijit Bora, 2024. "Weighted Myerson value for Network games," Papers 2402.11464, arXiv.org.
    6. Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2018. "The proportional Shapley value and applications," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 93-112.
    7. Demuynck, Thomas & Rock, Bram De & Ginsburgh, Victor, 2016. "The transfer paradox in welfare space," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 1-4.
    8. C. Manuel & D. Martín, 2021. "A value for communication situations with players having different bargaining abilities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 301(1), pages 161-182, June.
    9. Niharika Kakoty & Surajit Borkotokey & Rajnish Kumar & Abhijit Bora, 2023. "Weighted position value for Network games," Papers 2308.03494, arXiv.org.
    10. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2010. "Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 177-184, March.
    11. Radzik, Tadeusz, 2012. "A new look at the role of players’ weights in the weighted Shapley value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 223(2), pages 407-416.
    12. Marden, Jason R. & Shamma, Jeff S., 2015. "Game Theory and Distributed Control****Supported AFOSR/MURI projects #FA9550-09-1-0538 and #FA9530-12-1-0359 and ONR projects #N00014-09-1-0751 and #N0014-12-1-0643," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    13. Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2011. "An axiomatic approach to composite solutions," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 385, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    14. Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2012. "The Harsanyi paradox and the “right to talk” in bargaining among coalitions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 214-224.
    15. Julia Belau, 2018. "The class of ASN-position values," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(1), pages 65-99, January.
    16. van den Nouweland, Anne & Slikker, Marco, 2012. "An axiomatic characterization of the position value for network situations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 266-271.
    17. Borkotokey, Surajit & Kumar, Rajnish & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2015. "A solution concept for network games: The role of multilateral interactions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 243(3), pages 912-920.
    18. Wilson da C. Vieira, 2015. "Allocation of costs to clean up a polluted river: an axiomatic approach," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 1216-1226.
    19. Pierre Dehez, 2017. "On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-36, September.
    20. Jason R. Marden & Adam Wierman, 2013. "Distributed Welfare Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(1), pages 155-168, February.

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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