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On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values

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  • Pierre Dehez

    (CORE, University of Louvain Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

The concept of dividend in transferable utility games was introduced by Harsanyi [1959], offering a unifying framework for studying various valuation concepts, from the Shapley value to the different notions of values introduced by Weber. Using the decomposition of the characteristic function used by Shapley to prove uniqueness of his value, the idea of Harsanyi was to associate to each coalition a dividend to be distributed among its members to define an allocation. Many authors have contributed to that question. We offer a synthesis of their work, with a particular attention to restrictions on dividend distributions, starting with the seminal contributions of Vasil’ev, Hammer, Peled and Sorensen and Derks, Haller and Peters, until the recent papers of van den Brink, van der Laan and Vasil’ev.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Dehez, 2017. "On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-36, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:19:y:2017:i:03:n:s0219198917500128
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198917500128
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Dehez & Victor Ginsburgh, 2020. "Approval voting and Shapley ranking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 415-428, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Harsanyi dividends; Weber set; weighted Shapley values; core;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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