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Data Games : Sharing public goods with exclusion


  • Pierre Dehez
  • Daniela Tellone


A group of firms consider collaborating on a project which requires a combination of elements which are owned by some of them. These elements are nonrival but excludable goods i.e. public goods with exclusion like for instance knowledge, data or informations, patents or copyrights. We address the question of how firms should be compensated for the goods they own. We shown that this problem can be framed as a cost sharing game to which standard allocation rules like the Shapley value, the nucleolus or accountings formulas can be applied and compared. Our analysis is inspired by the need for a cooperation between European chemical firms within the regulation program REACH which requires them to submit by 2018 a detailed analysis of the substances they produce or import.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Dehez & Daniela Tellone, 2009. "Data Games : Sharing public goods with exclusion," Working Papers of BETA 2009-31, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2009-31

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Thierry Burger-Helmchen & Laurence Frank, 2011. "La création de rentes : une approche par les compétences et capacités dynamiques," Innovations, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 89-111.
    2. Pierre Dehez & Daniela Tellone, 2013. "Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 654-673, August.
    3. Pierre Dehez & Daniela Tellone, 2013. "Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 654-673, August.
    4. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Joël Thomas Ravix & Olivier Sautel, 2010. "Les informations exigées par la législation REACH : Analyse du partage des coûts," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 120(6), pages 991-1014.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Dehez & Sophie Poukens, 2013. "The Shapley value as a guide to FRAND licensing agreements," Working Papers of BETA 2013-03, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    2. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Philippe Solal, 2014. "Balanced collective contributions, the equal allocation of non-separable costs and application to data sharing games," Working Papers hal-01377926, HAL.
    3. Demuynck, Thomas & Rock, Bram De & Ginsburgh, Victor, 2016. "The transfer paradox in welfare space," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 1-4.
    4. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2012. "Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 157-178, February.
    5. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "On compensation schemes for data sharing within the European REACH legislation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 157-181, February.
    6. Pierre Dehez & Daniela Tellone, 2013. "Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 654-673, August.
    7. Dai, Meixing, 2011. "Motivations and strategies for a real revaluation of the Yuan," MPRA Paper 30440, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Houda Ghaya, 2011. "Board of Directors’ Involvement in Strategic Decision Making Process: Definition and Literature Review," Working Papers of BETA 2011-22, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    9. Meixing Dai & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2011. "Fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity: Stackelberg versus Nash equilibrium," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 3068-3076.
    10. Julien Jacob, 2011. "Innovation and diffusion in risky industries under liability law: the case of “double-impact” innovations," Working Papers of BETA 2011-24, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    11. Jenny Monheim-Helstroffer & Marie Obidzinski, 2011. "The EU legislation game: the case of asylum law," Working Papers of BETA 2011-16, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    12. Dehez Pierre & Poukens Sophie, 2014. "The Shapley Value as a Guide to FRAND Licensing Agreements," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 1-20, November.
    13. Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2016. "The proportional Shapley value and an application," Working Papers hal-01362228, HAL.
    14. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Phillippe Solal, 2017. "Coalitional desirability and the equal division value," Working Papers 2017-08, CRESE.
    15. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:19:y:2017:i:03:n:s0219198917500128 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Pierre Dehez, 2017. "On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-36, September.

    More about this item


    cost sharing; Shapley value; core; nucleolus.;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Value Theory
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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