How to share when context matters: The Mobius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games
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- BILLOT, Antoine & THISSE, Jean-François, 2002. "How to share when context matters: The Möbius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games," CORE Discussion Papers 2002025, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jacques-François Thisse & Antoine Billot, 2005. "How to share when context matters : The Mobius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games," Post-Print halshs-00754051, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Sergiu Hart, 2006. "Shapley Value," Discussion Paper Series dp421, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Fabien Lange & Michel Grabisch, 2006. "Interaction transform for bi-set functions over a finite set," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00186891, HAL.
- Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "On Weighted Shapley Values," Discussion Papers 602, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Chun, Youngsub, 1991. "On the Symmetric and Weighted Shapley Values," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(2), pages 183-190.
- Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 2002. "Variations on the shapley value," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 54, pages 2055-2076 Elsevier.
- Nowak Andrzej S. & Radzik Tadeusz, 1994. "The Shapley Value for n-Person Games in Generalized Characteristic Function Form," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 150-161, January.
- BILLOT, Antoine & THISSE, Jacques-François, 1999. "A discrete choice model when context matters," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1434, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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- Demuynck, Thomas & Rock, Bram De & Ginsburgh, Victor, 2016.
"The transfer paradox in welfare space,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 1-4.
- Demuynck, T. & De Rock, B. & Ginsburgh, V., 2015. "The transfer paradox in welfare space," CORE Discussion Papers 2015039, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Victor Ginsburgh, 2016. "The transfer paradox in welfare space," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/251993, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Victor Ginsburgh, 2015. "The Transfer Paradox in Welfare Space," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-01, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Fabien Lange & László Kóczy, 2013.
"Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(2), pages 281-292, July.
- Fabien Lange & László Á. Kóczy, 2010. "Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions," Working Paper Series 1002, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- Fabien Lange & Laszlo A Koczy, 2012. "Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions," Post-Print hal-00780511, HAL.
- Fabien Lange & Laszlo A. Koczy, 2012. "Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1220, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
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- Pierre Dehez, 2017. "On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-36, September.
- René Brink & René Levínský & Miroslav Zelený, 2015. "On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 449-471, May.
More about this item
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Value Theory
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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