An Axiomatic Approach to the Concept of Interaction Among Players in Cooperative Games
An axiomatization of the interactions between the palyers of any coalition is given. It is based on three axioms: linearity, dummy and symmetry. These interaction indices extend the Banzhaf and Shapley values when using in addition two equivalent recursive axioms. Lastly, the authors give an expression of the Banzhaf and Shapely interaction indices in terms of pseudo-Boolean functions.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITE DE LIEGE, Faculte d'economie, de gestion et de sciences sociales, Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie. 4000 Liege, BELGIQUE|
Web page: http://www.quantom.hec.ulg.ac.be/
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