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How to share when context matters: The Möbius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games

Author

Listed:
  • BILLOT, Antoine
  • THISSE, Jean-François

Abstract

All quasivalues rest on a set of three basic axioms (efficiency, null player, and additivity), which are augmented with positivity for random order values, and with positivity and partnership for weighted values. We introduce the concept of Moebius value associated with a o sharing system and show that this value is characterized by the above three axioms. We then establish that (i) a Moebius value is a random o order value if and only if the sharing system is stochastically rationalizable and (ii) a Moebius value is a weighted value if and only if the o sharing system satisfies the Luce choice axiom.

Suggested Citation

  • BILLOT, Antoine & THISSE, Jean-François, 2002. "How to share when context matters: The Möbius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2002025, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2002025
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    2. Azrieli, Yaron & Rehbeck, John N., 0. "Marginal stochastic choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    3. Rene (J.R.) van den Brink & Rene Levinsky & Miroslav Zeleny, 2018. "The Shapley Value, Proper Shapley Value, and Sharing Rules for Cooperative Ventures," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-089/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Demuynck, Thomas & Rock, Bram De & Ginsburgh, Victor, 2016. "The transfer paradox in welfare space," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 1-4.
    5. Manfred Besner, 2020. "Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(1), pages 193-212, June.
    6. Fabien Lange & László Kóczy, 2013. "Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(2), pages 281-292, July.
    7. Manfred Besner, 2020. "Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 851-873, September.
    8. Besner, Manfred, 2019. "Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi payoff," MPRA Paper 92247, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Michele Aleandri & Francesco Ciardiello & Andrea Di Liddo, 2025. "Power in Sharing Networks with a priori Unions," Papers 2507.13272, arXiv.org.
    10. Besner, Manfred, 2025. "Coalitional substitution of players and the proportional Shapley value," MPRA Paper 124625, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Besner, Manfred, 2025. "Coalitional substitution of players and the proportional Shapley value," MPRA Paper 123720, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Pierre Dehez, 2017. "On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-36, September.
    13. Besner, Manfred, 2021. "Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value," MPRA Paper 108241, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Besner, Manfred, 2021. "Disjointly and jointly productive players and the Shapley value," MPRA Paper 108511, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. René Brink & René Levínský & Miroslav Zelený, 2015. "On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 449-471, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Value Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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