On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and Harsanyi imputations
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- Michel Grabisch, 2013.
"The core of games on ordered structures and graphs,"
Annals of Operations Research,
Springer, pages 33-64.
- Michel Grabisch, 2009. "The core of games on ordered structures and graphs," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00445171, HAL.
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- Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Victor Ginsburgh, 2016. "The transfer paradox in welfare space," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/251993, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Victor Ginsburgh, 2015. "The Transfer Paradox in Welfare Space," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-01, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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- Emilio Calvo & Esther Gutiérrez-López, 2015. "The value in games with restricted cooperation," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0115, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
- repec:hal:cesptp:hal-00803233 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:19:y:2017:i:03:n:s0219198917500128 is not listed on IDEAS
- Pierre Dehez, 2017. "On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-36, September.
More about this item
KeywordsTU-games; Convex games; Core; Harsanyi set; Imputations; External stability; C71;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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