A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)
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Volume (Year): 41 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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- Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
- Rafels, C. & Tijs, S.H., 1997. "On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set," Other publications TiSEM 14435da8-14ce-4845-8e54-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Ken-Ichi Shimomura, 1997. "Quasi-Cores in Bargaining Sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 283-302.
- Vohra, Rajiv, 1991. "An existence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 19-34.
- Einy, Ezra & Wettstein, David, 1996. "Equivalence between Bargaining Sets and the Core in Simple Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(1), pages 65-71.
- Einy, Ezra & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1996. "Convex Games and Stable Sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 192-201, October.
- Greenberg, Joseph, 1992. "On the Sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern Abstract Stable Sets: The Stable and the Individual Stable Bargaining Set," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(1), pages 41-55.
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