Coalitionally Monotonic Set-solutions for Cooperative TU Games
A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the trade-off between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core- selection requirement by the core-extension property.
|Date of creation:||2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.ere.ub.es
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Toru Hokari, 2000. "note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 133-137.
- David Housman & (*), Lori Clark, 1998. "Note Core and monotonic allocation methods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 611-616.
- Daniel Granot & Michael Maschler, 1997. "The Reactive Bargaining Set: Structure, Dynamics and Extension to NTU Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 75-95.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
- Vincent Feltkamp & Javier Arin, 1997.
"The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 61-73.
- Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V., 1994. "The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games," Discussion Paper 1994-40, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- TamÂs Solymosi, 1999. "On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 229-240.
- Rafels, Carles & Ybern, Neus, 1995. "Even and Odd Marginal Worth Vectors, Owen's Multilinear Extension and Convex Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 113-26.
- Maschler, Michael, 1976. "An advantage of the bargaining set over the core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 184-192, October.
- Maschler, Michael, 1992. "The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 591-667 Elsevier.
- Derks, J J M, 1992. "A Short Proof of the Inclusion of the Core in the Weber Set," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 149-50.
- Rafels, C. & Tijs, S.H., 1997. "On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set," Other publications TiSEM 14435da8-14ce-4845-8e54-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Izquierdo, Josep M. & Rafels, Carles, 2001. "Average Monotonic Cooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 174-192, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:200275. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Espai de Recerca en Economia)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.