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The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games


  • Arin, J.
  • Feltkamp, V.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)


The process of computing the nucleolus of arbitrary transferable utility games is notoriously hard. A number of papers have appeared in which the nucleolus is computed by an algorithm in which either one or a huge number of huge linear programs have to be solved. We show that on the class of veto-rich games, the nucleolus is the unique kernel element. Veto-rich games are games in which one of the players is needed by coalitions in order to obtain a non-zero payoff. We then provide a fast algorithm which does not use linear programming techniques to compute the nucleolus of these games. Furthermore, we provide a few examples of economic situations which belong to the class of veto-rich games and which are treated in the literature.
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  • Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V., 1994. "The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games," Discussion Paper 1994-40, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:9d521726-5066-4631-9cb1-ce145826ae09

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    Game Theory;


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