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Formation d'une entente dans un appel d'offres au premier prix et risque de détection exogène

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  • Karine Brisset

Abstract

Nous analysons le problème de la formation d'une entente entre soumissionnaires à un appel d'offres au premier prix confrontés au risque d'être détecté. Considérant qu'une entente peut être détectée dès qu'un offreur est dénoncé, notre objectif est de déterminer l'influence de ce risque sur la taille d'équilibre de l'entente. Deux critères de rationalité individuelle sont retenus. Premièrement, nous considérons qu'un offreur accepte d'entrer dans l'entente si et seulement son profit espéré est supérieur à celui qu'il aurait en restant en dehors. Lorsque le risque de dénonciation est trop important, nous montrons qu'aucune coalition ne peut se former. Considérant ensuite qu'un offreur accepte de participer à l'entente dès qu'il obtient un profit espéré supérieur à celui qu'il aurait en l'absence de toute coalition, nous montrons qu'une entente ne peut se former que si elle comprend un minimum d'offreurs lorsque le risque de dénonciation est élevé.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Karine Brisset, 2001. "Formation d'une entente dans un appel d'offres au premier prix et risque de détection exogène," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 67(4), pages 405-419.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_674_0405
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1990. "Differential Payments within a Bidder Coalition and the Shapley Value," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 493-510, June.
    2. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    3. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    4. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-1239, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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