On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions
Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Volume (Year): 39 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm|
|Order Information:||Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Maschler, Michael, 1992. "The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 591-667 Elsevier.
- Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V., 1994.
"The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games,"
1994-40, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Vincent Feltkamp & Javier Arin, 1997. "The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 61-73.
- Potters, Jos & Poos, Rene & Tijs, Stef & Muto, Shigeo, 1989. "Clan games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 275-293, September.
- Toru Hokari, 2000. "note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 133-137.
- Potters, J.A.M. & Poos, R. & Tijs, S.H. & Muto, S., 1989. "Clan games," Other publications TiSEM 1855e4e3-7392-4ef0-a073-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Moulin, Herve & Thomson, William, 1988. "Can everyone benefit from growth? : Two difficulties," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 339-345, September.
- Yevgenia Apartsin & Ron Holzman, 2003. "The core and the bargaining set in glove-market games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 189-204, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:1:p:171-175. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.