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Tree-connected peer group situations and peer group games

Author

Listed:
  • Brânzei, R.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Fragnelli, V.
  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

A class of cooperative games is introduced which arises from situations in which a set of agents is hierarchically structured and where potential individual economic abilities interfere with the behavioristic rules induced by the organization structure.These games form a cone generated by a specific class of unanimity games, namely those based on coalitions called peer groups. Different economic situations like auctions, communication situations, sequencing situations and flow situations are related to peer group games.For peer group games classical solution concepts have nice properties.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Brânzei, R. & Fragnelli, V. & Tijs, S.H., 2002. "Tree-connected peer group situations and peer group games," Other publications TiSEM f4601b66-2e29-4969-85ca-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:f4601b66-2e29-4969-85ca-05a35707196e
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    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/488974/27795_19805.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gilles, Robert P & Owen, Guillermo & van den Brink, Rene, 1992. "Games with Permission Structures: The Conjunctive Approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(3), pages 277-293.
    2. Brânzei, R. & Fragnelli, V. & Tijs, S.H., 2000. "On the computation of the nucleolus of line-graph peer group games," Other publications TiSEM fd889ce3-d034-47a2-9f6b-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
    4. Vincent Feltkamp & Javier Arin, 1997. "The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(1), pages 61-73.
    5. Curiel, I. & Pederzoli, G. & Tijs, S.H., 1989. "Sequencing games," Other publications TiSEM cd695be5-0f54-4548-a952-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Potters, Jos & Reijnierse, Hans, 1995. "Gamma-Component Additive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(1), pages 49-56.
    7. Jean Derks & Hans Haller & Hans Peters, 2000. "The selectope for cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(1), pages 23-38.
    8. Curiel, Imma & Pederzoli, Giorgio & Tijs, Stef, 1989. "Sequencing games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 344-351, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. van den Brink, René & González-Arangüena, Enrique & Manuel, Conrado & del Pozo, Mónica, 2014. "Order monotonic solutions for generalized characteristic functions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 238(3), pages 786-796.
    2. René Brink & Chris Dietz, 2014. "Games with a local permission structure: separation of authority and value generation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 343-361, March.
    3. René Brink & P. Herings & Gerard Laan & A. Talman, 2015. "The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 99-123, January.
    4. Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2016. "Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 47-57.
    5. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Tvede, Mich & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2017. "Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 98-110.
    6. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0561-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. René Brink, 2008. "Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(2), pages 225-243, February.
    8. repec:has:discpr:1321 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. René Brink & Chris Dietz & Gerard Laan & Genjiu Xu, 2017. "Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(4), pages 903-923, April.
    10. Balázs Sziklai & Tamás Fleiner & Tamás Solymosi, 2014. "On the Core of Directed Acyclic Graph Games," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1418, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
    11. Brânzei, R. & Fragnelli, V. & Meca, A. & Tijs, S.H., 2006. "Two Classes of Cooperative Games Related to One-Object Auction Situations," Discussion Paper 2006-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. Rodica Brânzei & Tamás Solymosi & Stef Tijs, 2005. "Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(3), pages 447-460, September.
    13. Wernz, Christian & Deshmukh, Abhijit, 2012. "Unifying temporal and organizational scales in multiscale decision-making," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 223(3), pages 739-751.
    14. repec:spr:topjnl:v:25:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11750-017-0440-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Kuipers, Jeroen & Mosquera, Manuel A. & Zarzuelo, José M., 2013. "Sharing costs in highways: A game theoretic approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(1), pages 158-168.
    16. René Brink & René Levínský & Miroslav Zelený, 2015. "On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 449-471, May.

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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