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Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games

Author

Listed:
  • Rodica Brânzei

    ()

  • Tamás Solymosi

    ()

  • Stef Tijs

    ()

Abstract

Most of the known efficient algorithms designed to compute the nucleolus for special classes of balanced games are based on two facts: (i) in any balanced game, the coalitions which actually determine the nucleolus are essential; and (ii) all essential coalitions in any of the games in the class belong to a prespeci ed collection of size polynomial in the number of players.We consider a subclass of essential coalitions, called strongly essential coalitions, and show that in any game, the collection of strongly essential coalitions contains all the coalitions which actually determine the core, and in case the core is not empty, the nucleolus and the kernelcore.As an application, we consider peer group games, and show that they admit at most 2n - 1 strongly essential coalitions, whereas the number of essential coalitions could be as much as 2n-1. We propose an algorithm that computes the nucleolus of an n-player peer group game in O(n2) time directly from the data of the underlying peer group situation.
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Suggested Citation

  • Rodica Brânzei & Tamás Solymosi & Stef Tijs, 2005. "Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(3), pages 447-460, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:3:p:447-460
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-005-0213-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Le Breton, M & Owen, G & Weber, S, 1992. "Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(4), pages 419-427.
    2. Rodica Brânzei & Vito Fragnelli & Stef Tijs, 2002. "Tree-connected peer group situations and peer group games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 55(1), pages 93-106, March.
    3. Brânzei, R. & Fragnelli, V. & Tijs, S.H., 2000. "On the computation of the nucleolus of line-graph peer group games," Other publications TiSEM fd889ce3-d034-47a2-9f6b-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. D. Granot & F. Granot & W. R. Zhu, 1998. "Characterization sets for the nucleolus," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(3), pages 359-374.
    5. Maschler, M. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "The general nucleolus and the reduced game property," Other publications TiSEM ab187dab-1b5b-40c3-a673-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Vincent Feltkamp & Javier Arin, 1997. "The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(1), pages 61-73.
    7. Maschler, M & Potters, J A M & Tijs, S H, 1992. "The General Nucleolus and the Reduced Game Property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(1), pages 85-106.
    8. Solymosi, Tamas & Raghavan, T. E. S. & Tijs, Stef, 2005. "Computing the nucleolus of cyclic permutation games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 162(1), pages 270-280, April.
    9. Reijnierse, Hans & Potters, Jos, 1998. "The -Nucleolus of TU-Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 77-96, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. René van den Brink, 2017. "Games with a Permission Structure: a survey on generalizations and applications," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-016/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. repec:has:discpr:1321 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Balázs Sziklai & Tamás Fleiner & Tamás Solymosi, 2014. "On the Core of Directed Acyclic Graph Games," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1418, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
    4. René van den Brink & Ilya Katsev & Gerard van der Laan, 2008. "An Algorithm for Computing the Nucleolus of Disjunctive Additive Games with An Acyclic Permission Structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-104/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. repec:spr:topjnl:v:25:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11750-017-0440-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. van den Brink, René & Katsev, Ilya & van der Laan, Gerard, 2010. "An algorithm for computing the nucleolus of disjunctive non-negative additive games with an acyclic permission structure," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(2), pages 817-826, December.
    7. Takayuki Oishi & Gerard van der Laan & René van den Brink, 2016. "An Axiomatic Analysis of Joint Liability Problems with Rooted -Tree Structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-042/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    8. Takayuki Oishi & Gerard van der Laan & René van den Brink, 2018. "The Tort Law and the Nucleolus for Generalized Joint Liability Problems," Working Papers 37, Meisei University, School of Economics.
    9. Trudeau, Christian & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2017. "On the set of extreme core allocations for minimal cost spanning tree problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 425-452.
    10. Kuipers, Jeroen & Mosquera, Manuel A. & Zarzuelo, José M., 2013. "Sharing costs in highways: A game theoretic approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(1), pages 158-168.
    11. Tamas Solymosi & Balazs Sziklai, 2015. "Universal Characterization Sets for the Nucleolus in Balanced Games," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1512, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
    12. René Brink & Ilya Katsev & Gerard Laan, 2011. "A polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus for a class of disjunctive games with a permission structure," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(3), pages 591-616, August.
    13. René van den Brink & Ilya Katsev & Gerard van der Laan, 2008. "Computation of the Nucleolus for a Class of Disjunctive Games with a Permission Structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-060/1, Tinbergen Institute.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperative game; nucleolus; computation; peer group game;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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