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References listed on IDEAS
- Maschler, M & Potters, J A M & Tijs, S H, 1992. "The General Nucleolus and the Reduced Game Property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(1), pages 85-106.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2011. "The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries," Discussion Papers 1103, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Finus, Michael & McGinty, Matthew, 2015. "The Anti-Paradox of Cooperation: Diversity Pays!," Department of Economics Working Papers 46599, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
- Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2009. "Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 389-406, March.
- Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2004.
"An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities,"
Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series
ete0414, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael, 2009. "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2009-10, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
- Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2004. "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities," Working Papers 2004.155, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Rich, Karl M. & Winter-Nelson, Alex & Brozovic, Nicholas, 2005. "Regionalization and foot-and-mouth disease control in South America: Lessons from spatial models of coordination and interactions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 526-540, May.
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