How Can the Security of International Trade Be Financed in Developing Countries? A Global Public Good Approach
The aim of this article is to identify the modalities of financing international trade security. Our analysis is more specifically oriented toward the issue of financing developing countries, which must make a considerable effort to attain the required level, whereas the developed countries have already invested heavily in trade security since the events of September 11, 2001. First, we characterize security in the context of a global public good before studying the financing conditions and the discriminating criteria of the supply of the global public good security. We then present a critical analysis of the various possible sources and instruments for financing the global public good security and propose different financing scenarios, each one based on a specific allocation of responsibilities among the actors in security. We conclude by considering the role of the international institutions as managers of the financing and implementation of the security of international trade.
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