Pure Public Goods versus Commons: Benefit-Cost Duality
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2011. "The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries," Discussion Papers 1103, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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