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Common Property, Information, and Cooperation: Commercial Fishing in the Bering Sea

Author

Listed:
  • Robert H. Hicks

    () (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)

  • Alan C. Haynie

    () (Alaska Fisheries Science Center,National Marine Fisheries Service)

  • Kurt E. Schnier

    () (Department of Economics,Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University)

Abstract

A substantial theoretical and experimental literature has focused on the conditions under which cooperative behavior among actors providing public goods or extracting common-pool resources arises. The literature identifies the importance of coercion, small groups of actors, or the existence of social norms as conducive to cooperation. This research empirically investigates cooperative behavior in a natural resource extraction industry in which the provision of a public good (bycatch avoidance) in the Alaskan flatfish fishery is essential to the duration of the fishing season, and an information provision mechanism exists to relay information to all individuals. Using a mixed logit model of spatial fishing behavior our results show that conditionally cooperative behavior is prevalent but deteriorates as bycatch constraints tighten.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert H. Hicks & Alan C. Haynie & Kurt E. Schnier, 2008. "Common Property, Information, and Cooperation: Commercial Fishing in the Bering Sea," Working Papers 80, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:80
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Keith Evans & Quinn Weninger, 2014. "Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 353-372.
    2. John Lynham, 2017. "Identifying Peer Effects Using Gold Rushers," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 93(3), pages 527-548.
    3. Eliasen, Søren Qvist, 2014. "Cod avoidance by area regulations in Kattegat – experiences for the implementation of a discard ban in the EU," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 108-113.
    4. Barnes, Michele L. & Arita, Shawn & Kalberg, Kolter & Leung, PingSun, 2017. "When does it pay to cooperate? Strategic information exchange in the harvest of common-pool fishery resources," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 1-11.
    5. Jason Delaney & Sarah Jacobson, 2016. "Payments or Persuasion: Common Pool Resource Management with Price and Non-price Measures," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 747-772.
    6. Eliasen, Søren Qvist & Bichel, Nikolaj, 2016. "Fishers sharing real-time information about “bad” fishing locations. A tool for quota optimisation under a regime of landing obligations," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 16-23.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperative games; spatial econometrics; fisheries; location choice;

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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