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On the set of extreme core allocations for minimal cost spanning tree problems

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  • Trudeau, Christian
  • Vidal-Puga, Juan

Abstract

Minimal cost spanning tree problems connect agents efficiently to a source when agents are located at different points and the cost of using an edge is fixed. We propose a method, based on the concept of marginal games, to generate all extreme points of the corresponding core. We show that three of the most famous solutions to share the cost of mcst problems, the Bird, folk and cycle-complete solutions, are closely related to our method.

Suggested Citation

  • Trudeau, Christian & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2017. "On the set of extreme core allocations for minimal cost spanning tree problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 425-452.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:169:y:2017:i:c:p:425-452 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Juan J. Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Bargaining with commitments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 129-144.
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    10. Bahel, Eric & Trudeau, Christian, 2014. "Stable lexicographic rules for shortest path games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, pages 266-269.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Grabisch, Michel & Sudhölter, Peter, 2016. "On a class of vertices of the core," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 5/2016, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Business and Economics.
    2. Christian Trudeau & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2017. "Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value," Working Papers 1705, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    3. Marina Núñez, 2016. "Comments on: Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 24(2), pages 327-329, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Minimal cost spanning tree problems; Extreme core allocations; Reduced game; Bird solution; Folk solution; Cycle-complete solution;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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