Bargaining with commitments
We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which each player puts a prize to his resources before leaving the game. The only expected final equilibrium payoff can be defined by means of selective marginal contributions vectors, and it coincides with the Shapley value for convex games. Moreover, for 3-player games the selective marginal contributions vectors determine the core when it is nonempty.
|Date of creation:||24 Jun 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - Tex; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on HP; pages: 19 ; figures: none|
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