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Demand Commitment Bargaining: -The Case Of Apex Games

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  • BENNETT, E.
  • VAN DAMME, E.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Bennett, E. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Demand Commitment Bargaining: -The Case Of Apex Games," Papers 9062, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:tilbur:9062
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    Cited by:

    1. Geir B. Asheim, 1997. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 427-443.
    2. Juan J. Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Bargaining with commitments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(1), pages 129-144, January.
    3. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "Bargaining cum voice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 199-225, February.
    4. Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2007. "Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(04), pages 847-850, November.
    5. László Á. Kóczy, 2001. "Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Aapproach," Game Theory and Information 0111002, EconWPA.
    6. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2006. "Voice and Bargaining Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 1668, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Majority rip-off in referendum voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, January.

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    Keywords

    game theory ; bargaining ; economic models;

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