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Bargaining with commitments

  • Juan J. Vidal-Puga

    ()

We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which, given an order of players, the first n−1 players sequentially announce their reservation price. Once these prices are given, the last player may choose a coalition to cooperate with, and pay each member of this coalition his reservation price. The only expected final equilibrium payoff is a new solution concept, the “selective value”, which can be defined by means of marginal contributions vectors of a reduced game. The selective value coincides with the Shapley value for convex games. Moreover, for 3-player games the vectors of marginal contributions determine the core when it is nonempty. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001820400190
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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Games Theory.

Volume (Year): 33 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 129-144

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2004:i:1:p:129-144
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  1. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1997. "Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 825-51, November.
  2. Vidal-Puga, Juan & Bergantinos, Gustavo, 2003. "An implementation of the Owen value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 412-427, August.
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  9. Corts, Kenneth S. & Neher, Darwin V., 2003. "Credible delegation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 395-407, June.
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  11. (*), Y. Stephen Chiu & Ani Dasgupta, 1998. "On implementation via demand commitment games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 161-189.
  12. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994. "Bargaining and value," Economics Working Papers 114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
  13. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1992. "Revocable Commitment and Sequential Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 378-87, March.
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