IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Bargaining with commitments

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Juan J. Vidal-Puga

    ()

Abstract

We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which, given an order of players, the first n−1 players sequentially announce their reservation price. Once these prices are given, the last player may choose a coalition to cooperate with, and pay each member of this coalition his reservation price. The only expected final equilibrium payoff is a new solution concept, the “selective value”, which can be defined by means of marginal contributions vectors of a reduced game. The selective value coincides with the Shapley value for convex games. Moreover, for 3-player games the vectors of marginal contributions determine the core when it is nonempty. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001820400190
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer & Game Theory Society in its journal International Journal of Games Theory.

Volume (Year): 33 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 129-144

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2004:i:1:p:129-144
DOI: 10.1007/s001820400190
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Web page: http://www.gametheorysociety.org/about.html

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/182/PS2

Keywords: bargaining; demand commitment game; selective value;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
  • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
  • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Vidal-Puga, Juan & Bergantinos, Gustavo, 2003. "An implementation of the Owen value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 412-427, August.
  2. Fershtman, Chaim & Kalai, Ehud, 1997. "Unobserved Delegation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 763-774, November.
  3. Bester, Helmut & Sakovics, Jozsef, 2001. "Delegated bargaining and renegotiation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 459-473, August.
  4. Michael L. Katz, 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
  5. Bennett, E. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Demand Commitment Bargaining: -The Case Of Apex Games," Papers 9062, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  6. Corts, Kenneth S. & Neher, Darwin V., 2003. "Credible delegation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 395-407, June.
  7. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1997. "Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 825-851, November.
  8. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1992. "Revocable Commitment and Sequential Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 378-387, March.
  9. Winter, Eyal, 1994. "The Demand Commitment Bargaining and Snowballing Cooperation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(2), pages 255-273, March.
  10. (*), Y. Stephen Chiu & Ani Dasgupta, 1998. "On implementation via demand commitment games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 161-189.
  11. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1996. "A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 134-152, April.
  12. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-380, March.
  13. Moldovanu, Benny & Winter, Eyal, 1994. "Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 533-548, November.
  14. Harold Houba & Wilko Bolt, 1997. "Strategic bargaining in the variable threat game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 57-77.
  15. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-637, May.
  16. Selten,Reinhard, "undated". "A demand commitment model of coalition bargaining," Discussion Paper Serie B 191, University of Bonn, Germany.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as
in new window


Cited by:

  1. Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya, 2014. "Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
  2. Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2011. "Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 395-408, March.
  3. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2013. "Reference dependent altruism in demand bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 127-140.
  4. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
  5. Ying Chen, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  6. Yves Breitmoser, 2009. "Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 183-191, June.
  7. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2012. "A Violation of Monotonicity in a Noncooperative Setting," Discussion Papers 2012-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  8. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Demand commitment in legislative bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0511005, EconWPA.
  9. Breitmoser, Yves, 2011. "Binomial menu auctions in government formation," MPRA Paper 28576, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May.
  11. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2006. "Efficient bidding with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 304-320, November.
  12. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2011. "Ultimata bargaining: generosity without social motives," MPRA Paper 33613, University Library of Munich, Germany.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Access and download statistics

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2004:i:1:p:129-144. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

or (Rebekah McClure)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.