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Credible delegation

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  • Corts, Kenneth S.
  • Neher, Darwin V.

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  • Corts, Kenneth S. & Neher, Darwin V., 2003. "Credible delegation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 395-407, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:47:y:2003:i:3:p:395-407
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1992. "Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 299-308, Autumn.
    2. McAfee, R. Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1995. "The non-existence of pairwise-proof equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 251-259, September.
    3. Marius Schwartz & Earl A. Thompson, 1986. "Divisionalization and Entry Deterrence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 307-321.
    4. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    5. Baye, Michael R & Crocker, Keith J & Ju, Jiandong, 1996. "Divisionalization, Franchising, and Divestiture Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 223-236, March.
    6. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    7. Gillian K. Hadfield, 1991. "Credible Spatial Preemption through Franchising," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 531-543, Winter.
    8. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-265, March.
    9. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-230, March.
    10. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
    11. Alexander, Cindy R & Reiffen, David, 1995. "Vertical Contracts as Strategic Commitments: How Are They Enforced?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(4), pages 623-649, Winter.
    12. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, B & Picard, P, 1995. "Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 621-646, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine.
    2. Bru, Lluís & de Haro, José-Manuel Ordóñez & Faulí-Oller, Ramon, 2001. "Divisionalization in Vertical Structures," CEPR Discussion Papers 3011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Do Firms' Owners Delegate both Short-Run and Long-Run Decisions to Their Managers in Equilibrium?," Working Papers 0815, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    4. Marx, Leslie M. & Shaffer, Greg, 2004. "Opportunism and menus of two-part tariffs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(10), pages 1399-1414, December.
    5. Hongbin Cai & Walter Cont, 2004. "Agency Problems and Commitment in Delegated Bargaining," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 703-729, December.
    6. Suzuki, Ayako, 2009. "Market foreclosure and vertical merger: A case study of the vertical merger between Turner Broadcasting and Time Warner," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 532-543, July.
    7. Juan J. Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Bargaining with commitments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(1), pages 129-144, January.
    8. Foros, Øystein & Kind, Hans Jarle & Shaffer, Greg, 2011. "Resale price maintenance and restrictions on dominant firm and industry-wide adoption," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 179-186, March.
    9. Kopel, Michael & Brand, Björn, 2012. "Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 982-989.
    10. Czerny, Achim & Höffler, Felix & Mun, Se-il, 2013. "Port Competition and Welfare Effect of Strategic Privatization," EWI Working Papers 2013-13, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).
    11. Paolo Balduzzi, 2004. "Delegation Games with Full Commitment," Working Papers 70, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2004.

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